Fiscal policy in a small euro area economy by Vanda Almeida et al.
FISCAL POLICY IN A SMALL EURO AREA ECONOMY*
Vanda Almeida ** | Gabriela Castro ** | Ricardo Mourinho Félix ** | José R. Maria **
Abstract
This article discusses the role of ﬁ  scal policy in a small open economy of the euro area. 
In the context of a general equilibrium model, results suggest that ﬁ  scal policy can 
play an active role in stabilising the business cycle, having effects on production and 
households consumption. The analysis of the impact of ﬁ  scal measures should not, 
however, focus exclusively on its short-run effects, ignoring the medium-run impacts 
of the exit strategies necessary to ensure a sustainable path of public debt. Results 
suggest that, if ﬁ  scal stimulus measures are implemented, these should be temporary 
and that the adequate time lag to return to the initial ﬁ  scal stance depends, among 
other factors, on the evolution of the sovereign debt risk premium.
1. Introduction
This article discusses the role that ﬁ  scal policy can play in a small open economy integrated in a monetary 
union. The analysis is based on results obtained in Almeida, Castro, Félix and Maria (2010a, 2010b), in 
the context of a general equilibrium model called PESSOA. There are several reasons to use this type of 
models, among which the separation of economic impacts throughout several time horizons, divided by 
different markets, as well as the formal identiﬁ  cation of the main transmission channels.1
The analysis of the effectiveness of ﬁ  scal policy instruments is usually centered on its immediate or short-
run effects. However, the macroeconomic impacts of ﬁ  scal programs go beyond that horizon, namely 
due to the need of ensuring a sustainable path for public debt. In this article it is assumed, in particular, 
that the authorities announce with credibility that they intend to recover the initial ﬁ  scal stance, existing 
before the implementation of the ﬁ  scal programs, whether they are of a temporary or permanent 
nature. The analysis presented in this article also focuses on the macroeconomic impacts of alternative 
exit strategies, which may take place during different time horizons, and bring about changes in the 
sovereign debt risk premium.
The next section presents PESSOA, in a stylised and succinct way, with emphasis on the role of the 
government and households, and describes the ﬁ  scal program. Section 3 presents the macroeconomic 
implications of alternative ﬁ  scal policy measures. Section 4 evaluates the macroeconomic impact of 
alternative exit strategies that always garantee that the ﬁ  scal stance is paleced back in its initial position. 
Finally, section 5 presents the main conclusions.
1  A comparative analysis using general equilibrium models can be found in Cwik and Wieland (2010) and Coenen, 
Erceg, Freedman, Furceci, Kumhof, Lalonde, Laxton, Lindé, Mourougane, Muir, Mursula, de Resende, Roberts, 
Röeger, Snudden, Trabandt and in’t Veld (2010).
*  The authors are grateful for discussions had with Vítor Gaspar during the work that originated this article. The 
opinions expressed in the article are those of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with those of Banco de 
Portugal or the Eurosystem. Any errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author.










s2.  PESSOA: A general equilibrium model
The role that ﬁ  scal policy can play in a small open economy of the euro area is analysed in a context of 
a general equilibrium model named PESSOA (Almeida et. al., 2010c), created and calibrated to incor-
porate the distinct elements of an economy with these characteristics. As in Adolfson et al. (2007), it 
is assumed that the external environment is imune to developments in the small open economy. In the 
case of an economy integrated in the euro area, this assumption implies that domestic shocks do not 
affect monetary policy decisions. In this context, nominal stability is ensured by assuming perfect cred-
ibility of the inﬂ  ation target, set by the ECB in the case of the euro area. Dynamic stability, in turn, is 
ensured by the adjustment of international trade to ﬂ  uctuations of the real exchange rate, in a context 
where the nominal rate is irrevocably ﬁ  xed and is fully credible. To use an expression from Giavazzi and 
Paganno (1988), the small open economy in PESSOA is effectively “tying its hands” with the rest of the 
euro area members.
PESSOA closely follows the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (Kumhof, Muir, Mursula and 
Laxton, 2010). Households are non-Ricardian, following the overlapping generations model with stochastic 
ﬁ  nite lifetime proposed in Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965). This enables a more realistic response 
of economic agents to ﬁ  scal policy shocks than the one obtained in an inﬁ  nitely lived framework. The 
model is intrinsically New-Keynesian, assuming monopolistic competition and nominal rigidity in both the 
labour and product markets – a distant context from the perfect competition assumption. Furthermore, 
the model incorporates elements of real rigidity to obtain realistic responses of investment and imports.
Section 2.1 presents PESSOA in a succinct and stylised way. Special attention is paid to the behaviour 
of households and the Government, and in particular to the non-Ricardian features of the model, in 
order to thoroughly evaluate the role that ﬁ  scal policy can have in an open economy of the euro area. 
A more detailed presentation of the model, the formal optimisation problems of economic agents, as 
well as the calibration can be found in Almeida et al. (2010a, 2010b and 2010c). Section 2.2 presents 
in a stylised way the different ﬁ  scal programs.
2.1. The  model
Chart 1 presents PESSOA in a stylised way, giving special attention to some key elements. On the one 
hand, the different economic agents that compose the domestic economy are presented (numbered 
from 1 to 4). These agents exchange among themselves labour services, intermediate and ﬁ  nal goods, as 
well as income ﬂ  ows including labour income, ﬁ  rms dividends, tax payments and Government transfers 
to households.
On the other hand, Chart 1 highlights that decisions of agents 1 to 4 are conditioned by an external 
environment that, as already mentioned, is not inﬂ  uenced by any circumstance. For simpliﬁ  cation, it is 
assumed that the external environment corresponds to the remaining euro area countries. The connec-
tion between the domestic economy and the rest of the world is achieved through imports and exports 
of goods and services, as well as the purchase of foreign assets/debt by domestic households, which are 
conﬁ  ned to households that have access to asset markets (1a. in Chart 1).
Chart 1 also illustrates the fact that PESSOA is a dynamic model that converges in the long run to a 
steady state. The growth of economic activity in the long run only depends on the deterministic increase 
of technological progress, in a context where it is assumed that there is no population growth. The 
steady state consists of a stable and long-lasting equilibrium of macroeconomic aggregates. Note that 
in a general equilibrium model, the economy is in equilibrium in all periods, including each and every 
adjustment period (since demand is equal to supply in all markets in all periods). However, after a shock, 
the economy goes through a transition period with a sequence of temporary equilibriums, until the 

























































IIIby agents 1 to 3, who use all information available and anticipate the future evolution of all relevant 
variables. More precisely, any change of policy in a given moment t, such as a tax reduction to stimulate 
the economy, implies a sequence of effects that implies that the economy has to go through a set of 
temporary equilibriums (at moments t+1, t+2, etc.) until it reaches a new steady state. In the case of 
changes of a temporary nature, after the adjustment period, whose duration fundamentally depends on 
the degree of real and nominal rigidity, the economy returns to its initial steady-state. The mechanisms 
that ensure the dynamic stability of the model, i.e., convergence to a new well-deﬁ  ned steady state, are 
essentially rooted in the adjustment of prices and wages, which determine in each and every moment 
the real exchange rate, and in the interaction of this adjustment with the goods and assets ﬂ  ows with 
the rest of the euro area.
Households have stochastic ﬁ  nite lifetimes, facing an instant probability of death in line with the over-
lapping generations scheme proposed by Blanchard (1985) and Yaari (1965). Through an insurance 
contract, the surviving households receive in every moment the assets of the households that die. This 
framework turns the behaviour of these agents intrinsically non-Ricardian. If the Government ﬁ  nances 
a ﬁ  scal stimulus program through public debt issuance, for example, the future generations will be 
charged with the necessary taxes to pay that debt (which was created before these generations were 
born). The surviving families, in turn, by receiving assets from households who died, accumulate more 
assets than their future ﬁ  scal responsibilities, which they consider net wealth, therefore affecting their 
consumption decisions. In the case of a ﬁ  scal stimulus program, households prefer that its ﬁ  nancing is 
done by debt issuance instead of an immediate tax increase. The reason is simple: issuing debt implies 
that the ﬁ  scal program is partly ﬁ  nanced by future generations. The existence of a non zero probability 
of death implies that households who beneﬁ  t today from the effects of the ﬁ  scal program and survive 
will ﬁ  nance it in an amount that is inferior to their debt liabilities.2
PESSOA considers two types of households: the asset holders, who can access asset markets and perform 
both intra and inter-temporal optimisation, smoothing out their consumption over lifetime by trading 
2  The “probability of death” seen as physical death is not the only classiﬁ  cation used in the economic literature for 
this probability. Alternative designations include “economic probability of death” or “degree of myopia” of hou-






























































































sassets (called “1a. Households with access to asset markets”); and households that do not access asset 
markets and are, therefore, limited to intra-temporal optimisation (households 1b). Both types of house-
holds extract utility from consumption and leisure, through a constant relative risk aversion utility function. 
Furthermore, the existence of “unions” is admitted, on which households delegate wage negotiation. 
Labour market institutions generate monopolistic competition conditions, with “unions” using their market 
power to charge ﬁ  rms a wage higher than the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure, generating a wage premium that is appropriated by households. Households with access to debt 
markets are able to accumulate wealth and hold debt in the course of their lives, contrary to families 
without access to asset markets. These are a second source of non-Ricardian behaviour, since that, by 
not being able to reaffect consumption intertemporarily, they limit themselves to consuming all of their 
income in each period, being therefore extremely sensible to the implementation of ﬁ  scal programs and 
their ﬁ  nancing. The importance of this type of agents in the obtainance of realistic responses of private 
consumption to ﬁ  scal stimulus is presented in Galí, López-Salido and Vallés (2007). 
Househods behaviour in PESSOA contemplates a life-cycle income proﬁ  le, although in a very rudimentary 
way. This translates into a wage income adjusted by the labour productivity level of each generation, 
admitting that the younger generations are more productive than the older ones (a constant labour 
productivity rate of decay is considered). This assumption ampliﬁ  es the non-Ricardian effects, since a 
change in the labour income tax generates a differentiated effect between generations, yielding more 
revenues from younger generations, which are more productive and have, therefore, higher wage income 
than from older generations.
The Government can use a diversiﬁ  ed set of ﬁ  scal policy instruments. Revenues and spendings are 
detailed in Table 1. Besides consuming a speciﬁ  c ﬁ  nal good, highly intensive in non-tradable interme-
diate goods, the Government performs transfers to households. To ﬁ  nance its activity, the Government 
charges taxes over labour income (which includes not only the labour income tax but also contributions 
paid by employers), households consumption and ﬁ  rms dividends. In addition, the Government charges 
ﬁ  rms beneﬁ  ts from transfers from abroad. Taxes are distortionary, being an additional source of non-
Ricardian behaviour. The policy options that will be evaluated in this article are based on the macroeco-
nomic effects of ﬁ  ve instruments: public consumption (G), transfers to all households (TRG), transfers 
to households without access to asset markets (TRGB), taxes over labour income (
l Γ ) and taxes over 
households consumption ( c Γ ).
To postpone the necessary tax collection to ﬁ  nance expenditures, the Government can issue one period 
bonds, paying an interest rate over the stock of bonds held by households (type 1a in Chart 1). It is 
assumed that all bonds issued by the Government are held by domestic households, which can, however, 
buy debt from the rest of the world. The domestic interest rate differs from the rest of the euro area 
interest rate due to the existence of a risk premium, which can ﬂ  uctuate with the degree of Govern-
ment debt relative to its long-run level. Since the domestic economy is sufﬁ  ciently small, changes in the 
international investment position (IIP) of the small open economy have no impact on the interest rate of 
Table 1
PUBLIC SECTOR IN PESSOA
Spending Revenues
Government consumption () G Consumption taxes (
c Γ )
Transfers to all households (TRG) Labour income taxes ( l Γ )
• Without access to asset markets (TRGB)
• With access to asset markets
Interest outlays  Contributions paid by employers
Dividends tax 
Fiscal Balance (Global Balance) Transfers from the EU

























































IIIthe euro area. Contrary to models where households are inﬁ  nitely lived, the long-run IIP is determined 
endogenously in models with ﬁ  nite lifetime households (Frenkel and Razin 1996, Harrison et al. 2005).
Modelling a small open economy combines the necessary complexity that allows the model to be useful 
for the conduction of economic policy with sufﬁ  cient simplicity for the model to be analytically and 
computationally tractable. For example, the determination of the various macroeconomic equilibriums 
is conditioned by a strong budgetary discipline, which, although allowing authorities to choose between 
several options, eliminates the possibility of unsustainable trajectories of public debt. Notwithstanding, 
PESSOA is – like any economic model – a simpliﬁ  ed representation of the real world. The assumption of 
perfect foresight by households and ﬁ  rms (agents 1 to 3 in Chart 1) may be seen unrealistic, since there 
are limits to the formulation and solution of complex problems, either due to the quantity of necessary 
information, or to the incapacity of processing and computing the utility of each alternative action in 
order to guarantee the optimal choice. Furthermore, the absence of a ﬁ  nancial block that interferes 
with the decisions of economic agents, the inexistence of involuntary unemployment, or of externali-
ties associated with distinct public expenses (for example in the justice, health and education sectors), 
as well as the impossibility of considering effects over the distribution of households income, are other 
examples of the model limitations.
2.2.  A stylised ﬁ  scal program
Chart 2 presents a sequence of dates and economic policy measures that illustrate the ﬁ  scal programs 
presented in the next sections of this article. As an example, an increase in public consumption (G) is 
considered.
Chart 2 presents three relevant dates: t0, t1 and t2. By assumption, all dates are separated by four quar-
ters. The ﬁ  rst date - t0 - indicates the quarter in which the authorities announce and implement the ﬁ  scal 
program. Before t0 it is considered that public consumption was at its stationary level, which is deﬁ  ned 
in Chart 2 as GSS. If the program is temporary, then there is a date, t1, after which public consumption 
goes back to its initial level, GSS. On the contrary, if the increase in public consumption is permanent, 
then nothing happens in t1 and the new level is given by GSS+ Δ. The level Δ represents the dimension 
of the stimulus program. The obtained macroeconomic effects are conditional on the assumed proﬁ  le 
of the ﬁ  scal program.3
The method usually used to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of ﬁ  scal instruments is centered in 
the impact multiplier (Blanchard 2002, Canova 2007). This indicator, hereafter designated by impact 
multiplier, is deﬁ  ned as the ratio between the change in the variable of interest in the ﬁ  rst year (which 
corresponds to the time period between t0 and t1 in Chart 2) and the ex ante change in the same period 
of the ﬁ  scal balance. Without loss of generality it has been considered that the dimension of the stimulus 
always represents 1 per cent of the ex ante GDP stationary state, independently of the ﬁ  scal instrument 
used by the authorities.
The context of a general equilibrium analysis requires the maintenance of a sustainable trajectory of public 
debt. To ensure this trajectory, PESSOA, like most general equilibrium models with Government, includes 
a ﬁ  scal policy rule that determines in each period the public sector ﬁ  scal balance. The rule used in this 
article is based on the assumption that the Government sets clear and credible ﬁ  scal goals to which it is 
commited. In line with Kumhof et al. (2010), the rule has the following functional form:
Fiscal balance = Fiscal balanceLR + d1 × Revenue gap + d2 × Debt gap
3  There are other options in the literature, such as an increase in G at t0, followed by a gradual reversion or a proﬁ  le 
that represents a program that has effectively been announced (Furceri and Mourougane 2010, Cogan, Cwik, 










swhere d1 is the parameter that characterizes the pro-cyclical or contra-cyclical nature of ﬁ  scal policy and 
d2  is the parameter that determines the velocity of reestablishment of the long-run ﬁ  scal objectives. A 
value of parameter d1 below (above) one determines a pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) ﬁ  scal policy, while a 
higher value of d2 implies a lower tolerance by the authorities to deviations relative to the ﬁ  scal objectives 
and consequently has a faster exit strategy. While in practice the Government performs adjustments that 
tend to affect several items, it is usual to assume in this type of models, for clarity and simplicity, that 
only one item is adjusted. In this article, it has been chosen to endogenize the labour income tax rate  l Γ
, in light of what has been done in other models (Kilponen and Ripatti 2005, Kumhof and Laxton 2007). 
Holm-Hadulla, Leiner-Killinger and Slavík (2011) present empirical evidence that establishes a positive 
correlation between public debt (and interest payment) and labour taxes.
In a general equilibrium and perfect foresight context, all agents in the economy know and take as cred-
ible that the tax rate will only reach its stationary level when the two gaps in the rule are zero. This rate 
is therefore changed every time that cyclical conditions determine ﬁ  scal revenue levels that deviate from 
the levels that would prevail if the tax bases were in their stationary long-run values or when the public 
debt to GDP ratio deviates from its values in the stationary state. The existence of this rule ensures that 
in the stationary state the public debt to GDP ratio stabilises in a level pre-deﬁ  ned by the authorities 
and that the public sector ﬁ  scal balance is determined univocally, for each level of the interest rate and 
of nominal GDP growth.
Whether we are dealing with a temporary or permanent increase of public consumption, an adjustment 
of the public sector account will always have to occur (see Table1), to guarantee the return to a stationary 
state (see Chart 1), consistent with the objectives previously announced by the authorities. In the ﬁ  scal 
programs considered in this article it has been admitted that the ﬁ  scal policy rule is deactivated until 
date t2 of Chart 2, i.e., eight quarters after the beginning of the implementation of the program (in t0). 
In the case of a temporary stimulus, this date occurs after the period in which the program is in place 
in order to avoid an eventually paradoxal situation where the Government on the one hand promotes a 
ﬁ  scal stimulus and on the other hand, simultaneously, takes measures to correct the unbalance gener-
ated by that stimulus.
Chart 2

































































III3.  Macroeconomic impacts of ﬁ  scal policy
This section addresses the following questions under the assumption of perfect credibility: how effective 
is ﬁ  scal policy in a small open economy of the euro area? What instrument should be used to stimulate 
economic activity or the major components of demand, for example, household consumption? What are 
the medium and long-term effects of ﬁ  scal policy? Should the ﬁ  scal stimulus measures be permanent 
or temporary?
Section 3.1 presents the short-term macroeconomic impacts of temporary ﬁ  scal policy measures based 
on the instruments identiﬁ  ed in Table 1. Section 3.2 focuses on the medium-term effects. Section 3.3 
analyzes the macroeconomic effects of permanent ﬁ  scal policy measures, assuming that the budget 
deﬁ  cit and public debt objectives remain unchanged.
3.1.  Temporary program: short-run effects
Table 2 reports the impact multipliers obtained with PESSOA for a relatively diverse set of macroeconomic 
variables, based on: (i) a temporary and fully credible ﬁ  scal stimulus program, (ii) an ex ante deterioration 
of the budget balance of 1 percent of the initial steady state GDP, and ﬁ  nally, (iii) a ﬁ  scal policy rule that, 
relying exclusively on the endogenization of the tax rate on labor income  l Γ , guarantees that the public 
debt goes back to the level that prevailed before implementing the program.
The results show that all options have a positive impact on GDP, as well as on private consumption. 
The outcome thus suggests that ﬁ  scal policy in a small open economy integrated in the euro area can 
be effectively used for the purpose of macroeconomic stabilization. Additionally, a ﬁ  scal stimulus that 
represents 1 percent of GDP in the ﬁ  rst year causes an increase in GDP, in most cases, less than 1 percent. 
This result implies that a reduction in revenues or an increase in government expenditures may end up 
being channeled in the ﬁ  rst year for an increase in savings or imports. In contrast with the traditional 
Keynesian multipliers, the reported below unity multipliers are in line with several DSGE models (Cwik 
and Wieland 2010). Hall (2009) argues that the Keynesian assumption of no restrictions in the aggregate 
supply of the economy helps to explain the multipliers associated with those traditional models.
All impact multipliers on households consumption are positive, regardless of the ﬁ  scal program, in 
contrast to what happens in models with purely Ricardian households. This is partly explained by the use 
Table 2
IMPACT MULTIPLIERS OF ALTERNATIVE FISCAL PROGRAMS | PERCENTAGE DEVIATIONS FROM THE INITIAL STEADY-















GDP 1.02 0.24 0.57 0.37 0.38
Private consumption 0.90 0.78 1.86 0.71 0.96
Public consumption 4.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Private investment -0.62 -0.18 -0.40 0.06 -0.09
Exports -0.66 -0.32 -0.78 0.06 -0.19
Imports 0.65 0.29 0.71 0.29 0.37
Hours 1.66 0.23 0.63 0.48 0.40
Real wage 0.94 0.42 1.04 -0.79 1.56
Real exchange rate -0.27 -0.13 -0.31 0.02 -0.08
Inﬂ  ation 0.29 0.09 0.22 -0.03 -1.62
IIP -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.69 -1.07
Public Debt 0.12 0.46 0.18 -0.11 1.21
Source: Authors calculations.
Notes: The real exchange rate is an indirect quotation and is calculated based on the prices of tradable goods. Inﬂ  ation used to 
calculate the real wage, is calculated based on prices of consumer goods paid by households. The results are conditional on the 










sof public debt issuance to ﬁ  nance the ﬁ  scal program. Given the probability of death of households, some 
of this debt is paid only by future generations. Since these future generations have to pay more income 
taxes in the future, current generations have an incentive to consume that would not exist if they had 
to bear the taxes needed to pay the entire debt that has been issued. The multipliers on consumption 
are slightly ampliﬁ  ed by the existence of families that, in each period, consume all disposable income.
The highest impact multiplier on GDP is the one based on public consumption. In this case, a ﬁ  scal 
balance deterioration of 1 percent of GDP, which implies an increase of about 4.5 percent of govern-
ment consumption ex ante, has an impact of around 1 percent of GDP. In the case where the stimulus is 
based on transfers to households without access to asset markets the impact is 0.6 percent. If based on 
a reduction of taxes on income or consumption, the impact is 0.4 percent. Finally, the smallest impact is 
achieved through an increase in transfers to all households (0.2 percent). The results thus suggest that if 
the goal of authorities is to stimulate GDP, the ﬁ  scal instrument that is more efﬁ  cient to achieve it is public 
consumption. This result will justify the use of this instrument in the subsequent sections of this article.
A major reason behind the different magnitudes of the impact multipliers is the fact that stimulus asso-
ciated with transfers or taxes have an effect on aggregate demand that is largely indirect. The main 
transmission channel of transfers and taxes is associated with the evolution of disposable income and 
households wealth. The effect on GDP is reduced in these two cases because, on the one hand, in the 
case of households with access to asset markets, part of this income will be saved and used to cope 
with higher taxes in the future. On the other hand, a greater ﬂ  ow of real imports should be expected, 
since the import content of ﬁ  nal goods consumed by households is greater than that associated with 
public consumption. If public consumption is used as an instrument to stabilize the cycle, the effect on 
demand is direct. Additionally, there is an indirect effect that results from the increase in labour income 
due to rising wages associated with higher demand for labour-intensive goods.
If the goal of authorities is to stimulate private consumption, not GDP, results presented in Table 2 suggest 
that the most effective instrument to achieve it is to increase transfers to families who lack access to 
asset markets (which will also have a noticeable effect on GDP). The increase in transfers to all families 
has less impact, as part of the increased income of households with access to the asset markets will be 
saved in the period when the public expenditure is made.
The effects on investment are imminently negative, except in the case of a temporary reduction of the 
labour income tax  l Γ 4. This development mainly reﬂ  ects a reduction in investment expenditure in a 
context in which agents anticipate a fall in prices of capital goods and realize the temporary nature of 
the shock after the initial inﬂ  ationary impact.  Additionally, the increase in prices of domestic production 
determines a real appreciation, which negatively affects competitiveness and medium-run perspectives, 
despite the initial impact. Investment is subject to real adjustment costs and therefore tends to react 
more to developments in the medium and long term than to temporary increases in demand.
The authorities responsible for the conduct of ﬁ  scal policy in a small open economy integrated in the 
euro area cannot ignore the effects that their different options have on prices. Thus, measures to 
increase government spending tend to lead to price increases, while tax reduction measures involve 
less relevant impacts on prices and on competitiveness. It should be noted that although a reduction in 
taxes on consumption implies a signiﬁ  cant decline in consumer prices, its impacts on other prices and 
on competitiveness are limited.
4  The negative impact on investment is in line with the results obtained in other DSGE models (Cwik and Wieland, 
2010). However, in most DSGE models monetary policy is available, since the economy does not integrate a mo-
netary union and the fall in investment reﬂ  ects an increase of the real interest rate driven by an increase of the 
nominal interest rate. In PESSOA, the increase of the real interest rate reﬂ  ects expectations of price decreases, after 

























































IIIFiscal stimulus measures that put upward pressure on future inﬂ  ation of consumer goods amplify the 
impacts on aggregate demand due to the reduction of the real interest rate. This effect is also present in 
economies with autonomous monetary policy, if the lower limit of zero percent interest rate is reached 
(Eggertsson 2009, Christiano et al. 2009), or if monetary policy is fully accommodative (Freeman et al. 
2009). However, on the other hand, if the policy measures put upward pressure on prices of tradable 
goods and ultimately on the price of exports, it will result in contractionary effects resulting from a fall 
in exports and an increase in the imported content of domestic production.
3.2.  Temporary program: medium run effects
Although the usual method of measuring the effectiveness of ﬁ  scal policy is to focus on the impact 
multiplier, the macroeconomic effects are clearly not limited to this horizon. Beyond the fact that the 
temporary nature of the program implies a return of the policy instrument to its initial level, it will always 
be necessary to ensure the payment of the issued debt, which occurs in a gradual way in PESSOA.
Chart 3 presents the evolution of the labour income tax that ensures in the long run a return to the 
initial ﬁ  scal stance. As can be seen, all ﬁ  scal programs presented require an increase of this rate after 
the second year, after which the ﬁ  scal rule starts to be active, and a gradual reduction to the long-run 
stationary levels over the simulation horizon. The abrupt reduction of this rate in the ﬁ  rst year occurs 
when the ﬁ  scal authority uses it as the instrument of the ﬁ  scal program.
Chart 4 presents the impacts in PESSOA for a relatively diverse set of macroeconomic variables over a 
time horizon of 10 years. These effects are associated with the return of the ﬁ  scal instrument to its initial 
level, as well as the activation of the ﬁ  scal rule. Assumptions (i) to (iii), which were in the origin of the 
results presented in Table 2, remain unchanged. The results illustrate from the outset that the macro-
economic effects of ﬁ  scal programs entail a relatively intricate set of real and income ﬂ  ows between 
the different economic agents, until the stationary state is reached again. It is up to the ﬁ  scal authority, 
to take stock of the obtained results, to politically value them and, accordingly, take the decision that 
is more adequate to its goals. According to OECD (2009), countries implemented economic policies in 
2009 that were based on instruments both on the expenditure and revenue sides.
Among the results, note ﬁ  rst that, due to the temporary nature of the stimulus and the way it was 
designed, one should expect in all cases a reduction or households consumption and of GDP, between 
Chart 3
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IMPACTS OF FISCAL PROGRAMS | PERCENTAGE DEVIATIONS FROM THE INITIAL STEADY-STATE; INFLATION, IIP, FISCAL 
BALANCE AND PUBLIC DEBT DIFFERENCES IN PERCENTAGE POINTS
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Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
  Labour income tax                  Consumption tax                  General transfers                    argeted transfers                    Gov. consumption
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The periodicity is annual. The structural ﬁ  scal balance may differ from the effectively registered since it is computed with the 
tax bases at their stationary level. The real exchange rate is an indirect quotation and is calculated based on the prices of tradable 

























































IIIthe ﬁ  rst and second years. The decision to place the ﬁ  scal instrument back to its initial level implies a 
reduction in GDP that, in most cases, goes beyond the levels that characterized the initial state.
Secondly, debt consolidation will always involve an improvement of the ﬁ  scal balance relative to its steady 
state value. The Government structural ﬁ  scal balance assumes values higher than the initial steady state 
from the third year onwards, ensuring that public debt converges to the target, which is assumed to be 
exactly the same as the one prevailing before the program.
The comparative analysis of the different effects over time associated with the different ﬁ  scal instruments 
shows that the labour income tax should also be considered by the ﬁ  scal authority as a stimulus measure. 
While, on the one hand, it does not produce the higher impact multipliers on GDP or private consumption, 
it does not produce, on the other hand, a recessive effect similar to the one of the remaining options in 
the year in which the tax rate is repositioned at the initial level. Unlike other instruments, the second year 
remains a year in which GDP, household consumption, private investment and exports remain above the 
steady state (although at a lower level than in the ﬁ  rst year). From the third year onwards, the effects 
associated with the different options are more similar.
The evolution of investment stems from a relatively complex set of interactions, where the foresight 
of the future plays a key role. The ﬁ  nal result is determined inter alia by the temporary nature of ﬁ  scal 
measures, the evolution of the real interest rate and the relative price of investment goods. Thus, the 
temporary increase of the price of investment goods, in a context where agents anticipate the temporary 
nature of ﬁ  scal policy measures and where investment is subject to real rigidity, determines a reduction of 
spending on capital goods. With the exception of the use of labour income tax, all other options analised 
in Chart 4 imply in fact a further reduction of private investment in the second year of the program.
If the ﬁ  scal authority chooses to stimulate the economy with a temporary increase in government 
consumption, which has the highest impact multiplier on GDP (see Table 2), there will be an increase in 
demand for one type of goods with a high non-tradable content and very labour intensive. The increase 
in demand for these intermediate goods results in an increased demand for labor, which implies an 
increase in wages for all families. Despite the compression of proﬁ  t margins, domestic prices increase 
and there is an appreciation of the real exchange rate, with negative impact on exports. Following the 
increase in income, households without access to the asset market react immediately and increase their 
consumption, while households with access to asset markets increase savings, but also the level of private 
consumption, as part of the increase in public debt is taken as an increase in wealth.
In line with the other expenditure components, imports show a decline to levels below the steady state 
after the year in which the stimulus is removed, gradually converging in the subsequent years to levels 
that prevailed before the stimulus. This evolution has a high positive correlation with the behavior of 
economic activity.
Among the most signiﬁ  cant effects shown in Chart 4 is the one of inﬂ  ation, in case the ﬁ  scal program 
is based on changes in the consumption tax rate. This fact is explained by the direct impact that the tax 
reduction has on consumer prices in the ﬁ  rst year, followed by the decision to place the same rate back 
in the second year.
3.3.  Permanent program: increase of public consumption
The temporary nature of the stimulus in all cases analyzed above implies a reduction of household 
consumption or GDP in the second year. This result, independent of the ﬁ  scal instrument that is used, can 
create an incentive to implement programs of a more permanent nature, which justiﬁ  es the presentation 
in the different time horizons of an economic policy with these features.
This subsection presents an example of the impact of a ﬁ  scal measure with permanent nature: an increase 










showever that the results are qualitatively very similar to any program of permanent increase in public 
spending ﬁ  nanced by distortionary taxes, notwithstanding the fact that the impacts can be quantitatively 
different for some variables.
The evolution of the labour income tax rate associated with a permanent increase of public consump-
tion is presented in Chart 5. As can be seen, a permanent increase of 1 percent of GDP ex ante implies 
an expressive and permanent increase of the tax rate in order to maintain unchanged the deﬁ  cit and 
debt objectives. This evolution, which ensures the return to the initial ﬁ  scal stance, will have particularly 
negative effects on economic activity. Chart 6 shows the impact over several macroeconomic variables 
in different time horizons, including those that can be obtained in the very long run. These impacts are 
compared to those presented in Chart 4, where a temporary program was considered.
The impact multipliers over GDP or consumption remain positive, although lower than those of the 
temporary program. The reduction of these multipliers is explained by the anticipation of recessionary 
effects associated with the need to increase, in an equally permanent way, the labour income tax in the 
medium and long term. The need to ﬁ  nance a permanent increase in government consumption implies 
that all generations, present and future, will pay more taxes. In the case of households with access to 
the asset markets, these savings increase more than in the case where the program is temporary.
Unlike the case of temporary programs, the permanent increase of public consumption leads to a new 
steady-state in which the real increase of this variable does not compensate the permanent reduction 
in the other components of aggregate expenditure. GDP, in particular, presents a permanent fall. The 
dominant effect underlying this evolution results essentially from the increase in the tax rate in order to 
ﬁ  nance the ﬁ  scal program. Labour supply decreases, reﬂ  ecting the strong disincentive to work stemming 
from the tax increase. This evolution contributes to reduce household consumption in a permanent way, 
relative to the initial steady-state, affecting households welfare in a signiﬁ  cant way (Almeida et al., 2010b).
The real wage paid by ﬁ  rms increases permanently to ensure the necessary labour supply, implying a 
permanent loss in competitiveness and a decrease in exports. The reduction of the capital stock desired 
by ﬁ  rms implies a downward adjustment of investment, which reaches a permanently lower level. The 
fall in exports, higher than the fall in imports, contributes to a deterioration in the long-run of the 
international investment position relative to the initial steady-state, which does not occur in the case of 
a temporary program.
Chart 5














Notes: The chart presents annual values between years 1 and 40. The long-run is deﬁ  ned as “LR”. The remaining deﬁ  nitions, as 
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sAs in temporary programs, there is a clear reduction path of public debt from the date when the ﬁ  scal 
policy rule is activated onwards. The maintenance of the ﬁ  scal goals that prevailed before the Govern-
ment program is in this way ensured and only implies a recomposition of the Government balance 
presented in Table 15.
As mentioned above, it may further be noted that, in general, all ﬁ  scal programs involving both a 
permanent increase in expenditure and taxation in order to ensure the return to the initial ﬁ  scal policy 
stance, tend to produce undesirable medium and long-term effects in PESSOA, which are mainly due to 
the distortionary effects of these taxes.
4.  Alternative exit strategies
The transmission mechanism of ﬁ  scal policy is conditioned by the exit strategy that agents expect that 
the authorities will have. It is assumed, in all cases that the exit strategy is perceived equally by all agents, 
who incorporate it in their decision making process. This strategy may be more or less rapid in bringing 
the ﬁ  scal stance back to its initial stance.
This section considers two alternative exit strategies identiﬁ  ed as “Fast” and “Slow”, which differ in the 
time gap that agents envision that the authorities consider desirable to return to the initial ﬁ  scal stance6. 
The results obtained with each alternative exit strategy are compared to those previously presented 
(“Reference” exit strategy).
Section 4.1 presents the macroeconomic impact of alternative exit strategies, in a context of maintenance 
of the risk premium on sovereign debt. Section 4.2 considers the possibility that these strategies can 
take place in a context where there is an increase in the risk premium, correlated with the deviation of 
public debt from the objective set by the ﬁ  scal authorities.
The simulations presented are based on the assumption that ﬁ  scal authorities announce exit strategies 
perceived by agents as credible. This assumption implies in particular that agents perceive the consolida-
tion measures as being implementable within the announced timeframe. In this context, exit strategies 
whose trajectory involves extremely strong consolidation measures may not be taken as credible by agents. 
In the simulations, government consumption is considered as the ﬁ  scal instrument used for business 
cycle stabilization and the ﬁ  scal rule is, as before, activated two years after the start of the program (t2 
in Chart 2).
4.1.  Without change in the risk premium
Chart 7 shows the evolution of the labour income tax rate required for the ﬁ  scal balance and the public 
debt return to the levels pre-deﬁ  ned by the Government, which prevailed before the ﬁ  scal program. No 
change in the economy’s risk premium is considered in any of the simulation exercises. As can be seen, 
the tax rate increases in a more signiﬁ  cant way in the case of the Fast strategy and in a less visible way 
in the case of the Slow strategy.
5  It is possible to ﬁ  nd other possibilities in the literature. Röeger and Veld (2010), for example, evaluate the impact 
of a permanent deterioration of 1 per cent of the ﬁ  scal balance, which, according to the assumptions on long-run 
growth of nominal GDP implies in the DSGE model an increase in the ratio of public debt to GDP of 20 p.p. This 
deterioration of the ﬁ  scal balance would imply in PESSOA an increase in public debt of approximately 25 p.p., 
relative to the ex ante steady-state GDP.
6  Technically, the simulations implied an adjustment of parameter d2 of the ﬁ  scal rule presented in Section 2 of 
this article. In the case of the Slow strategy, the parameter was reduced to practically zero; in the case of the 
Fast strategy, it was increased to around four times of the Reference strategy. Almeida et al., (2010b) presents 

























































IIIThe macroeconomic impacts of the alternative exit strategies are presented in Chart 8. Firstly, it can be 
seen that the impact multipliers are almost the same. Thus, maximizing the impact on GDP in the ﬁ  rst 
year depends only to a minor extent on the different exit strategies. The similarities are not limited to 
the ﬁ  rst year, existing until the moment when the ﬁ  scal rule is effectively activated. After the ﬁ  rst two 
years, the results begin to diverge signiﬁ  cantly, which is an element that should be valued by the ﬁ  scal 
authorities in the selection of the speed of the ﬁ  scal consolidation process.
The Reference simulation represents an intermediate option when compared to the Fast and Slow strate-
gies. The increase in the tax rate is so signiﬁ  cant in the case of the Fast strategy that the public debt goes 
immediately to values close to the long-run target, producing a recessive effect on economic activity.
In the case of the Slow strategy, the increase in the tax rate is so smooth that the public debt reduces 
only gradually after the rule is activated. Due to the high inertia, the public debt remains well above its 
long-run value even after ten years. This result occurs in parallel with a faster return of the economy 
to values close to the stationary state, with GDP being almost at its steady-state value from the fourth 
year onwards.
In the absence of any movement in the economy’s risk premium, results in Chart 8 indicate that there 
are several factors that favor the option of a Slow strategy, in which the ﬁ  scal consolidation process is 
very gradual. These results are in line with a large literature that suggests that the optimal ﬁ  scal policy 
corresponds to tax smoothing (Chari and Kehoe 1999, Chari et al. 1994). Besides not reducing the 
short-term effect on GDP or consumption, and not having the undesirable effects associated with a 
permanent increase of public consumption, this exit strategy is visibly less recessive in the medium-run 
than the Fast or Reference strategies. This conclusion, while justifying the creation of public debt that 
is consolidated only very gradually with tax increases is not, however, robust to a context in which the 
risk premium does not remain unchanged.
4.2.  With change in the risk premium
The increase in the sovereign debt risk premium registered in the most recent period suggests the 
possibility of a relationship between risk premiums and the indebtedness level of the economies. This 
subsection analyses the three strategies considered (Slow, Fast and Reference) in a context where the 
risk premium is associated with the level of public debt, in contrast to the previous simulations where it 
was assumed to be constant.
Chart 7
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IIIIn this context, it was considered an increase in the risk premium of 6 basis points for each percentage 
point of increase in the public debt. This value was calibrated based on the existing literature, particu-
larly in studies for the United States, which point to increases of the interest rate between 1 and 6 basis 
points for each percentage point of increase in public debt ( Laubach 2003, Engen and Hubbard 2004, 
and Gale and Orszag 2004).
Charts 9 and 10 show the evolution of the labour income tax rate as well as the economy’s risk premium. 
Until the activation of the ﬁ  scal rule, the tax rate remains unchanged in the three strategies considered 
(Slow, Fast and Reference). Thereafter, the tax rate increases sharply and in a more expressive way than 
before, i.e. in the case in which the various alternative exit strategies does not imply any impact on the 
risk premium. 
The increase in interest rates in the small open economy creates a positive differential in relation to the 
interest rate that prevails in the euro area and implies an increase in interest outlays for the same level of 
public debt stock. The higher the interest rate the greater the increase in public debt during the period in 
which the ﬁ  scal policy rule is disabled. To return to the initial ﬁ  scal stance, it is now necessary to reduce 
the public debt from higher levels than in the case where there was no impact on the risk premium.
The macroeconomic impacts of the Fast, Reference and Slow exit strategies in the case in which the small 
open economy agents see an increase in the risk premium due to the increase in the public debt are 
presented in Chart 11. As can be seen, the impact multipliers are slightly lower than the ones previously 
reported, particularly in the case of the Slow strategy. The short-term multiplier of private consumption 
is even negative in the ﬁ  rst year, reﬂ  ecting to a large extent the more expressive increase of the domestic 
real interest rate. Additionally, the medium-run effects also seem to discourage the implementation of 
the Slow strategy. Both GDP and households consumption present in this case a higher period of time 
below the levels associated with the stationary state. On the contrary, the promotion of a Fast strategy 
is the one that puts the economy in the medium run more rapidly in the stationary state. However, it is 
crucial that the substantial ﬁ  scal policy measures necessary for this strategy are possible.
Chart 9 Chart 10
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This article discusses the role of ﬁ  scal policy for macroeconomic stabilization in a small open economy 
of the euro area. The analysis was conducted in a general equilibrium context in order to capture the 
transmission mechanisms that cannot be analysed in partial equilibrium contexts. The results suggest that 
ﬁ  scal policy can play an active role in stabilizing the business cycle, affecting several variables of interest, 
in particular GDP and households consumption. Fiscal programs should not however focus exclusively on 
the short-run effects and ignore the medium run impacts of the ﬁ  scal consolidation strategies, i.e., of 
the need to adequate public revenues and spendings after the end of the program such that the ﬁ  scal 
policy stance returns to its initial position.
The diversity of effects obtained showed that macroeconomic stabilization is clearly a multidimensional 
problem. It will always be up to the ﬁ  scal authority to set priorities and decide according to the objec-
tives it desires to achieve. According to the results, if the objective is to stimulate economic activity, the 
most effective way of achieving it is by a temporary increase of public consumption. If the objective is to 
increase households consumption, the best way to achieve it is by an increase in transfers to households 
without access to asset markets, whose marginal propensity to consume is higher. The results further 
substantiate the perspective that a permanent increase in government consumption generates undesir-
able effects over time, particularly due to the ﬁ  nancing needs implied by that decision.
The results obtained in this article are far from those suggested by the traditional Keynesian multipliers, 
which are typically obtained in a context of partial equilibrium and, in the most extreme cases, do not 
translate the impacts on supply conditions and its interaction with the sources of ﬁ  scal policy ﬁ  nancing. 
Additionally, there are recessionary effects associated with the reversal of a ﬁ  scal stimulus that cannot 
be neglected and that stem from the need to consolidate after the stimulus programs, i.e., to return to 
the initial ﬁ  scal policy stance.
Finally, the effectiveness of stabilisation programs is not independent of the economy’s risk premium 
attributed by agents participating in asset markets. If it is reasonable to assume that this premium remains 
constant, results tend to favour a slower and more gradual exit strategy. If the stimulus program entails an 
increase of the risk premium, due to the level of public debt, the results favour a faster exit strategy, since 
otherwise it can end up in a situation more undesirable and long-lasting than the initial one. However, 
it is crucial that the ﬁ  scal measures necessary to implement such a strategy are perceived as feasible.
The role of ﬁ  scal policy presented in this article is conditioned by the assumptions and calibration of 
PESSOA (Almeida et al., 2010C). It is not considered, for example, policy options that involve structural 
changes in the economy or generate externalities, such as an improvement of the justice system or of 
education. The effects of these measures are beyond this article. The effects that may arise from ﬁ  scal 
policies more focused in the long-run are not evaluated as well, for example associated with a reduc-
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